Reconsidering the. Robustness of. Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Lessons from the Arab Spring. Eva Bellin. Valeriia Gladkaia, učo Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons Author Eva Bellin; Book or Journal Comparative Politics; Vol. ROA is still valid in explaining the Arab Spring. “the coercive apparatus capacity and will + the level of political mobilization are decisive”.

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Consider the case of Bwllin, in which various security wings remained on the same side and fulfilled different repression functions. Indeed, a major theme in this paper is time. At the same time, the trajectory of the Arab Spring highlights an empirical bel,in for the Arab world, namely, the manifestation ofhuge, cross-class, popular protest in the name of political change, as well as a new factor that abetted the materialization of this phenomenon—the spread of social media. In both Egypt and Tunisia, the two bodies have continually fought for limited state financial resources.

Between Domestic and External Challenges. Export in format suitable for direct import into delicious. You can also specify a CiteULike article id. In the following pages, the paper first traces the historic power dynamic between the two most important wings of the security apparatus and then considers the key differences in interests that caused the split at the time of the protests. American University in Cairo Press,pp.

The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East : Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective

To add insights to the currently lacking literature on defection and coercive apparatus disaggregation, the paper suggests the following areas for research: International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, 1: As a disclaimer, it is important to acknowledge that decision-making is not always possible to unravel and justify, especially when closed institutions like the military and Interior Ministry in a closed region like the Middle East are involved.

Search all the public and authenticated articles in CiteULike. In fact, coup-proofing literature establishes that Arab regimes deliberately and uniquely constructed parallel militaries to counterweight the regular armed forces, which they saw as sources of potential coups. One hundred and thirteen officers, 82 noncommissioned officers and 49 soldiers all from the army, navy and air force were detained in relation to the alleged coup.


Table 1 Distribution of defense budget under Ben Ali [28] The Tunisian military felt it had not received sufficient material to carry reconsideringg its mandate [29] and needed more basic comfort and amenities like sleeping bags for its troops. Accessed February 27, The Tunisian military felt it had not received sufficient material rsconsidering carry out its mandate [29] and needed more basic comfort and reconsideding like sleeping bags for its troops. By clicking “OK” you acknowledge that you have the right to distribute this file.

At the point of defection, the interior security forces were at their weakest, the probability of regime collapse was highest and subsequent risks associated with defection were lowest. On one hand, the Interior Ministry was inextricably tied to the regime. The events of the Recomsidering Spring have suggested the necessity of rethinking the logic of authoritarian persistence in the Arab world.

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Conclusion and Looking Ahead On a final note, it is evident that the coercive apparatus in the two countries where the Arab Spring caused perhaps the most rupture was not only internally heterogeneous in structure but also in strategic interests and decision-making calculi. CiteULike uses cookies, some of which may already have been set.

Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Midd by Magdolin Harmina on Prezi

Lessons from the Arab Spring. Here’s an example of what they look like:. Have you read this? Armies and internal security forces. The army is arguably the most popular institution in both countries. Setting up reading intentions help you organise your course reading. The main argument here concerns the top leadership of each of the organs.

In fewer words, a history of inter-organ competition followed by a unique instance of regime weakness persuades one party—in this case, the army—to defect. Literature Review The fundamental principle behind this paper is to reject the impression of a robstness security apparatus.


You may hide this message. Third Place — Repatriating Machu Picchu: Lee, Terence, Defect or defend [electronic resource]: Accessed February 22, This national spectacle is a perfect example of controversial coup-proofing in action—a heavily militarized police monitoring the activities of an apolitical military and punishing it to keep the regime safe.

Due to the opaque nature of security organs, information can be difficult to obtain; cases like Libya, with its many local militias, Saudi Robutsness, with its royal divisions, and Bahrain, with robusstness outsourced mercenaries, defy consistent analysis.

Rentier militaries in the gulf states: Among these, the crucial ones were internal cohesion in relation to the masses and post-revolt survival in relation to the regime.

Firstly, the army and the police varied vastly in terms of public support and popularity. Some citation styles add the source URL, which you may not want. Register and you can start organising your references online.

What ega reading intentions? Showing of 34 extracted citations. Dependence on the regime and self-sufficiency In addition, militaries and security agencies considered the extent of their own dependency on the regime and their ability to exist and prevail without it. Democratization and Revolution Next: If they had wanted, both could have acted in the same repressive manner in in Egypt and Tunisia—yet only one chose to do so, emphasizing a difference in strategic interests that surpassed reconsidfring similarity in character.

At the same time, it is well established that years of police brutality and Interior Ministry humiliation was a huge driving force behind the Arab Spring. Please see the “Submission Guidelines” tab for further information. Monday 31 December It has already been established that the agency-army tussle over the years disenchanted the military but actually wooed and benefited the security forces.