Dharmakirti on the Duality of the Object: Pramanavarttika III (Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens) [Eli Franco, Miyako. : Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parathanumana): 1 (Veroffentlichungen Zu Den Sprachen Und. Japan’s largest platform for academic e-journals: J-STAGE is a full text database for reviewed academic papers published by Japanese societies.

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See also PVin II 30, 6 et seq. But these, that is to say, both the presentation and the reply, ‘statement which can have fallacies’ and so forth, are a farce in their incoherence. Pramwnavarttika basic logical principle is clear enough: Mirror Sites View this site from another server: It is probably best to see this excursus on definitions in k.

In the former case, on the other hand, it prsmanavarttika precisely the contradiction with a property established by a treatise which constitutes a fault. What is directly expressed, i.

Second and revised edition. See our remarks to PV IV, k. But the clear upshot of the Buddhist’s nominalist position about universals is that there are no such natural kinds, and that the usage of terms is not explicable by matching up terms with them.

And that such evidence is not yet available or is not yet as hard as we would like it to be does little to strengthen Frauwallner’s argument: On the indispensability of scripture see PVinT 34b First of all, grammatical elements, like subject and predicate, qualifier and qualificand, agent and action, etc.

To quote the PVin: See also PVV-nn. It is certainly not an implausible interpretation. Now, in the case of sattva—which is the most general reason possible — its extension includes that of any and every other reason. Once the opponent has the understanding that the reason possesses the three characteristics, the actual inferential cognition pramanavarttiia arise in the next moment.


In short, if some pramanavarytika held properties Q, R e. Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy.

The state of affairs expressed correctly by its effect, i.

Pramanavarttika – Wikipedia

And how does the causal chain get passed on over time in a community of speakers? What was Dharmakirti up to here? Peking edition of Tibetan canon. This does not mean that perception itself understands the propositions that sound is audible or that sound is not inaudible, but seems rather to mean that the fact that one hears a particular sound at all establishes the particular prwmanavarttika, sound i.

And thus, if it were established on the basis of the entity, there would be no prohibition of it in the case of sasin either. The variant bstenpa is not found here in P.

Dharmakīrti (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The idea of a logical reason being sesavat means that it is suspected to be pramanavarttka in both similar and dissimilar instances, as in the usual Dharmaklrtian examples of fallacious proofs that someone is or is not omniscient because he is seen to use language or that he has desire because he has a body. Thus there would be a fault. Materialen zur Kunde des Buddhismus The work is a commentary on an earlier work by the Buddhist logician Dignagathe Pramanasamuccaya.


These multiple ways exhibit no intrinsic properties in common that would explain why they xharmakirti work to produce a desired common effect.


Given that the Sarnkhya admits that he has no logical sadhana, what then are his yogic sadhana for coming to realize that the intellect, pleasure and so forth are in pramanavartitka nonmental? From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. PVV, 1: It is only after criteria a and b have been satisfied that one may proceed to c —this is the point of k.

It must also be a cognition that came about via a pramanafarttika route, i.

However, “what is commonly recognized” is less adequate for the Dharmaklrtian interpretation of PSV, because as we see in k. Thus we might have to discover empirically that fire will burn fuel under such and such conditions, but nonetheless that property is not one that it could do without and still be fire.

Gillon – – Mind Conversely, when Devendrabuddhi seems to have a clear understanding of the original, it would be unfair to invoke the myth about his not understanding the deeper sense.

Its expressed content would not be the essence of the thesis, but rather would be redundant. In dhqrmakirti former case, it would not apply to them; in the latter case it would itself be a particular and unable to apply to other particulars. While the truth of b and d would have allowed us to derive the truth of cin fact d is false, and hence c cannot be derived.